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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
vs.

*
*
*

WILLIAM WILLEY III.,
Defendant and Appellant.

*
*

Appellate No. 950644-CA
Priority No. 3

INTRODUCTION
Defendant/Appellant, William Willey III., relies on his opening brief and refers
this Court to that brief for the statements of jurisdiction, issues, standards of review,
cases and facts. Defendant/Appellant responds to the States' answer to his opening
brief as follows.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The occupants in this case were seized within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 LEd.2d 889 (1968). At no
point were the occupants free to leave. Accordingly, the encounter between the
trooper and the occupants was not a consensual encounter. The trooper exceeded
the permissible scope of the stop and the search of the vehicle was done in the
absence ol probable cauhi,.

ARGUMENT
A. THE ENCOUNTER BETWEEN THE TROOPER
AND THE OCCUPANTS WAS NOT CONSENSUAL.
(Reply to Point One of Respondent's Opening Brief)
The State attempts to dismiss Willey's claims on the basis that the encounter
reverted to a level one stop because the trooper returned the license and registration
to the driver and he never ran a license or warrants check. (Appellee's brief at page
5, fn. 2). The State further claims that the officer stayed for purely benevolent
reasons: he was simply helping Mr. Patefield fix the burnt out light. These arguments
should fail for two reasons.
First, there was never any testimony that the license and registration was
returned to the driver nor was there testimony as to whether the trooper had run a
license or a warrants check. Likewise, there was no testimony that Mr. Patefield had
requested the trooper's help or that Mr. Patefield did not have his own flashlight.
Secondly, even assuming the documentation was returned, this does not in and
of itself, turn the seizure into a consensual encounter.
In United States v. Werkina. 915 F.2d 1404 (10th Cir. 1990), the Tenth Circuit
deferred to trial court's determination that the defendant was free to leave because his
documents were returned to him. This holding was revisited in United States v.
Sandoval. 29 F.3d 537, 538 (10th Cir. 1994). There, the Tenth Circuit found that the
failure of an officer to return the property of a motorist is a factor which precludes a
2

finding that an encounter is consensual because no reasonable person would feel free
to leave. The Court, however, clearly required that the totality of the circumstances
test be applied, regardless of whether the property of the motorist is returned.
In Sandavol. as here, the government argued that because Mr. Sandavors
property was returned, it was merely a police-citizen encounter. In rejecting this
argument, the Court clarified the significance of the return of the documents:
No single factor dictates whether a seizure had occurred,
in the context of traffic stops, this Court has adopted as an
incidence of a seizure the officer's taking of necessary
documentation (driver's license and vehicle registration)
from a driver, and we have also considered as a necessary
(but not always sufficient) condition of the termination of
that seizure the officer's return of such documentation.
Both of those rulings being based on the premise that the
requisite consent is impossible because no reasonable
person would feel free to leave without such documentation
. . . After the point at which the driver has his or her other
documentation back, the touchstone of our analysis is
simply w h e t h e r . . . the driver has an objective reason to
believe that he was not free to end his conversation with
the law enforcement officer and proceed on his way.
Sandavol at 540.
Thus, Sandavol makes it clear that the return of the property is a "necessary
condition" to a finding that the encounter is voluntary. The legal significance of the
return of the documents, however, is not to automatically convert a detention into a
consensual encounter because the Court must still weigh all of the factors to make a
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determination, under the totality of the circumstances, that the person was free to
decline the officer's request or otherwise terminate the encounter.
Defendant urges the Court to consider the circumstances of the stop. After
being advised that the license plate light was burned out1, the trooper failed to
communicate, by words or conduct, that the occupants were free to leave. The
trooper never even indicated that he had determined that he was not going to write a
citation. As far as the occupants knew, they were still being investigated for the
violation of a burned out license plate light. Indeed, the driver asked permission to get
out of the vehicle to look at the light which the trooper,,allowedH him to do. Such an
interaction is inconsistent with a consensual encounter. Certainly, if the driver felt the
need to ask the trooper permission to get out of his own car, the driver would hardly
have felt that he was free to unilaterally terminate the encounter. Moreover, there was
no manifestation of the trooper's decision to relinquish his authority: not once did he

^hile it is true that Defendant conceded that the trooper never verbally demanded
that the light be fixed, Defendant's position was that the trooper still created the impression
that the driver had to fix the light immediately. Although the colloquy between counsel and
the trial court was ambiguous on this issue, the trial court, nevertheless, understood
Defendant's position in its holding:
"Even if Mr. Patefield would have understood or did understand
or reasonably understood from his conversation with the officer
that he had to stay there, and he had to go fix it right then, well
that ~ Well, if the officer either intentionally or mistakenly
communicated that to them, it was still something that - that the
officer was entitled to do." (R. 60 - 61)
4

indicate that the occupants were free to go on their way nor did he say that
he was simply staying to offer assistance with the light. Instead, he followed the driver
around the vehicle, watching his every move. Granting the driver permission to get
out of the vehicle and "bird dogging" him implies that the occupants were still
detained.
At a minimum, in order to find that a reasonable person would feel free to
leave, there would have to be some confirmation by the trooper that their burned out
license plate light was not going to result in a citation or any further detention. It is
simply wrong to suggest that a reasonable person would feel free to leave after being
stopped by an officer, told about an equipment violation, followed by silence of the
officer while he remained at the driver's window. Indeed, such an interaction suggests
that the trooper was abrupt, accusatory and dictatorial in demeanor.
Neither the facts in this case nor common sense suggests that the occupants
were free to leave. Accordingly, under the totality of the circumstances, it seems clear
that a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave or otherwise terminate the
encounter.

B. THE TROOPER DID NOT HAVE PROBABLE CAUSE
TO SEARCH THE AUTOMOBILE.
(Reply to Point Two of Respondent's Opening Brief)
The State rejects Appellant's position that the trooper based his probable cause
assessment on the fact that the driver had alcohol on his breath and that the van
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contained an open 12-pack from which several containers were missing: "Specifically,
the reasonable inference from the evidence presented was that the open 12-pack of
beer and coolers were within defendant's and Patefield's reach" (Appellee's brief at
page 21) and "Defendant's assertion ignores the fact that, while the trial court focused
primarily on the odor of alcohol and presence of 12-packs of beer (one of which was
opened), the trial court made clear that those two facts had to be considered 'in view
of all the circumstances'" (Appellee's brief at page 21, fn. 5).
The trooper testified that the probable cause to search was based on the odor
of alcohol and the missing containers. Likewise, these are the factors on which the
trial court focused:
And, really the only question I think in this case worth
addressing is whether the probable - - whether the
combination of those things taken in view of all the
circumstances, these twelve packs of beer, one of which
had clearly had been opened and from which containers
were missing combined with the odor of alcohol on a
driver's breath, whether those combined make it more likely
than not that there will be ~ that this individual has had an
open container in the vehicle or that there has been
someone in the vehicle with an open container of alcohol or
drinking alcohol in the vehicle. . .
// we stopped a hundred cars on the road which had a
driver with the odor of alcohol on his breath, and open
twelve-pack of beer with containers missing from it and you
didnt know anything more than that, would fifty-one of
those be situations were there was an open container of
alcohol in the vehicle, I think there would be. I think- In
this case, it turned out there wasn't. But, I think more that
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fifty-one cases out of a hundred, you would -- you would
find an open container of alcohol under this combination of
circumstances.
(R. 61 - 63)
Clearly, the issue before the trial court was whether the odor of alcohol and the
open twelve pack with containers missing constituted probable cause.
The State should be precluded from now arguing that the location of the cooler
was another factor which should be considered in deciding if there was sufficient
probable cause to search the vehicle. In United States v.Guzman. 864 F.2d 1512
(10th Cir. 1988), the Court stated:
Determining the constitutionality of intrusions by the
prosecution's ability to justify them under some set of
objective circumstances would undermine the Court's
concern with limiting unreviewable discretion in the name of
the objective test designed to safeguard that concern,
jd- at 1516.
Moreover, if every search was judged on this basis and upheld if there was any
valid basis for such a search, then there could never be an unconstitutional search.
The logic of the District Court is also problematic: Specifically, the reasoning
that if 100 motorists were stopped where the driver had the odor of alcohol on his
breath and had an open twelve pack with missing containers in the vehicle, 51%
would have an open container. The Court is logically drawing a conclusion on facts
which do no exist. The is not based on personal knowledge nor is it based on the
7

statistical analysis of any study that has been done. More importantly, such reasoning
is at odds with the fundamental principle that the reasonableness of police conduct is
fact specific and such facts are to be reviewed on a case by case basis.
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the district court's guessing was right
(that 51% had open containers), this cannot, in turn, justify the absolute disregard of
the other 49%'s constitutional right to be free from unreasonable search and seizures.
Here, the factors presented do not rise to the level of reasonable suspicion, let
alone probable cause. When asked about consuming alcohol, the driver stated that
he had a beer for dinner. That answer was consistent with the fact that he did not
have a strong odor of alcohol about him and there was no indication that the alcohol
had been consumed in the vehicle (such as the odor of alcohol emanating from the
vehicle or the presence of bottle caps). That there were several cases of beer, one
of which was open with half of the containers missing, adds little to the analysis. It
was obvious that all the missing containers were not all consumed by the driver.
In United States v. Gonzalez. 763 F.2d 1127 (10th Cir. 1985), the defendant
was stopped for speeding. As the officer approached the vehicle, he smelled a strong
odor of deodorizer. The defendant produced a valid driver's license as well as a valid
registration, however, the defendant could not name the car's owner. The officer
suspected that the car was stolen so he retained the driver's itinerary and asked the
driver to follow him to a police station, where he obtained consent and searched the
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car. Id at 1128.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit held that once the officer obtained negative
answers concerning his suspicions, he should have allowed the defendant to proceed
on his journey or arrest him for a crime. The fact that the officer "was unable to
articulate particular facts-other than the deodorizer smell and the unusual combination
of automobile license, registration, and title documents-" detracts from reasonable
suspicion to detain and search defendant's vehicle, jd^ 1128, 1129-31.
Likewise, Trooper Eldridge obtained negative answers concerning his
suspicions, he should have allowed the occupants to proceed on their way or arrest
them.
Finally, in Utah v. Rochell. 850 P.2d 480 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), this Court
addressed the issue of when probable cause exists to believe that a defendant has
open containers or has been drinking in a vehicle. There, the defendant was legally
stopped for speeding. When the officer pulled him over, the defendant got out of the
car. The officer requested his driver's license and registration. The defendant went
back to the car to get the documentation and when he opened the door, a cup
containing alcohol fell onto the ground. Furthermore, both occupants smelled of
alcohol and the defendant admitted that he was drinking. This Court held that there
was probable cause to believe that defendant had an open container in the vehicle
and had been drinking while driving, i d at 482.
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The case at hand stands in sharp contrast to Rochell. Here, all that the trooper
was aware of was the smell of alcohol on Mr. Patefield's breath. The trooper had no
doubt that Mr. Patefield was not impaired. All he saw was several twelve packs of
beer, one of which was open and had containers missing. These factors do not rise
to the level of reasonable suspicion, let alone probable cause, that the driver had been
drinking in the vehicle. The trooper lacked the specific, articulable facts to say that
the driver had been drinking while driving and was merely acting on a hunch when he
searched the vehicle. A search based on a hunch cannot withstand constitutional
scrunity. This Court, the Utah Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court
have never upheld the legality of a search based on an officer's unsupported intuition
and this Court should refuse to do so now.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the trial court's denial of
Mr. Willey's suppression motion.
DATED this - ^

day of April, 1996
Respectfully submitted:
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//Attorney for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
was mailed, postage prepaid, to Todd Utzinger, Assistant Attorney General, at P.O.
Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 and hand-delivered to Craig Halls, San
Juan County Attorney, at 297 Soutt>MairTirr Monticello, Utah 84535 on this V ^
day of April, 1996.
/
/ ^,~
JSALIE REILLY
^Attorney for Appellant
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